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| Registros recuperados: 45 | |
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| Rausser, Gordon C.; Simon, Leo K.. |
| This paper extends the Stahl-Rubinstein model of bilateral bargaining to incorporate many players and multidimensional issue spaces. A central feature of our framework is that in each round of negotiations, a proposer is selected randomly. Our bargaining model consists of a sequence of finite-horizon games, in which the horizon increases without bound. A solution to our model is a limit of equilibrium outcomes for the finite horizon games. A necessary condition for existence of a deterministic solution is that the limit outcome belongs to the core of the underlying bargaining problem. Solutions, if they exist, are generically unique. Two sets of sufficiency conditions for existence are presented. The paper concludes with examples and applications. In... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Research Methods/ Statistical Methods. |
| Ano: 1992 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7198 |
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| Baylis, Katherine R.; Peplow, Stephen; Rausser, Gordon C.; Simon, Leo K.. |
| The EU has argued that some agricultural subsidies are needed to provide the optimal amount of externalities (both positive and negative) produced by agriculture. The argument is that agriculture is "multifunctional" and externalities such as rural development and landscape would be underproduced, while some forms of pollution (such as nitrogen runoff) would be overproduced without government intervention. Meanwhile, the United States has raised the concern that multifunctionality is primarily an argument to transfer income to producers. One way to try and determine how much of these non-commodity payments are directed to externalities and how much is intended to distribute income to producers is to analyze the variation of the programs among the... |
| Tipo: Report |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24162 |
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| Baylis, Katherine R.; Peplow, Stephen; Rausser, Gordon C.; Simon, Leo K.. |
| European Union (EU) agri-environmental programmes (AEPs) represent a significant step in the region's efforts to decouple agricultural output from production and export subsidies. While AEPs comprise only a small share of EU agricultural support, they have two possible external impacts: 1) the composition of the EU's imports and exports may change as their producers become more market responsive; and 2) the WTO's Green Box (subsides considered minimally trade distorting and hence not disciplined) may become increasingly contentious. Our concern is with the drivers of AEPs in the EU and their implications for Canada. |
| Tipo: Report |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24149 |
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| Freebairn, John W.; Rausser, Gordon C.. |
| It is postulated that some issues of economic policy in general, and of Australian agricultural policy in particular, may be analysed in the framework of an adaptive control model. Policy making is characterized as a rational, sequential decision-making process under conditions of imperfect knowledge in which forthcoming information may be used to learn about the uncertain terms as decision periods pass. Emphasis is given to the linear-quadratic control problem. The paper provides a review of the formulation of a policy problem in the framework of an adaptive control model and of derived policy strategies. An illustrative example is reported. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural and Food Policy. |
| Ano: 1974 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/22890 |
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| Baylis, Katherine R.; Casamatta, Georges; Peplow, Stephen; Rausser, Gordon C.; Simon, Leo K.. |
| The EU has argued that some agricultural subsidies are needed to provide the optimal amount of externalities (both positive and negative) produced by agriculture. The argument is that agriculture is "multifunctional" and externalities such as rural development and landscape would be underproduced, while some forms of pollution (such as nitrogen runoff) would be overproduced without government intervention. Meanwhile, the United States has raised the concern that multifunctionality is primarily an argument to transfer income to producers. In this paper, we discuss the motivation for the EU agri-environmental measures and empirically test for those underlying causes. We find that the programs are not targeted at those regions with the highest... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19297 |
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| Rausser, Gordon C.; Bryant, Henry L.. |
| Academia and the finance industry generate many proposals for new contract markets. Unfortunately, many proposed markets lack the critical attributes that promote success. We examine these attributes, and evaluate the potential of several announced proposals. We find that proposals emanating from the academy generally fail to consider the full suite of integrated financial services necessary to support a viable market, while proposals put forward by practitioners are much more likely to do so. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Marketing. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19018 |
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| Alexander, Corinne E.; Goodhue, Rachael E.; Rausser, Gordon C.. |
| Agency theory explanations for agricultural contract designs are often observationally equivalent to perfect information explanations. Further in order to test properly the hypothesis that moral hazard is important one must first test and accept the hypothesis that agents respond to contract incentives. If agents do not respond to contract incentives then it is unlikely that moral hazard is significant. Accordingly we move beyond contract design and focus on whether or not we can reject the hypothesis that moral hazard is important by examining growers responses to price incentives for processing tomato quality. We utilize a natural experiment. In our data set growers deliver processing tomatoes under a price incentives contract and for a fixed price per... |
| Tipo: Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Demand and Price Analysis. |
| Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/123595 |
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| Antinori, Camille; Rausser, Gordon C.. |
| Current natural resource policy emphasizes devolved control to local levels of government and stakeholder groups. Effective strategies are as yet unclear, given mixed results in devolutionary efforts and few empirical analyses. Using original community-level survey data from Oaxaca, Mexico, a region with 90% common property forestland, the study describes how existing community governance structures accommodate an increasing local role in managing forest land. Multidimensional performance indicators for forest condition and group rule conformance are constructed and regressed on measures of democratic involvement and attendance rate at general meetings within the community setting. Empirical results show that community officials and foresters working... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; O17; Q23. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25076 |
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| McCluskey, Jill J.; Rausser, Gordon C.. |
| Recent rangeland reform attempts have increased ranchers' uncertainty of retaining grazing permits on federal land. This uncertainty is analyzed with a model of grazing on federal land. Ranchers facing this uncertainty will behave differently than if they were guaranteed the renewal of grazing permits at constant real grazing fees. It is shown that the socially optimal outcome may be achieved by adding avoidable risk through targeted rangeland reform. Rangeland reform attempts that create unavoidable risk can make both ranchers and environmental groups worse off. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural and Food Policy. |
| Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/30875 |
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| Just, Richard E.; Rausser, Gordon C.. |
| The lens used by the courts and much of the antitrust literature on predatory selling and/or buying is based on partial equilibrium methodology. We demonstrate that such methodology is unreliable for assessments of predatory monopoly or monopsony conduct. In contrast to the typical two-stage dynamic analysis involving a predation period followed by a recoupment period, we advance a general equilibrium analysis that demonstrates the critical role of related industries and markets. Substitutability versus complementarity of both inputs and outputs is critical. With either monopolistic or monopsonistic market power (but not both), neither predatory overselling nor predatory overbuying is profitably sustainable. Two-stage predation/recoupment is profitable... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Marketing. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7194 |
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| Registros recuperados: 45 | |
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